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PARTY POLITICAL HOMOGAMY IN GREAT BRITAIN 
 
ABSTRACT   This paper focuses on husbands' and wives' party political 
identifications in combination. There is a high level of party political 
homogamy in Great Britain (i.e. spouses tend to share the same party political 
identification). Statistical analyses show that levels of homogamy vary 
according to strength of party political identification, parental homogamy, age 
and marital status. Levels of party political similarity are also shown to differ 
between marriage and other social relationships, and between first marriages 
and remarriages. Attitudes towards homogamy are shown to vary with age. 
The implications of these findings for theories relating to the origins of 
homogamy and to the consequences of heterogamy are considered. Broadly 
speaking, the findings indicate that party political homogamy is a consequence 
of demographic constraints, utility-maximising choices, and responses to 
cultural norms. 
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PARTY POLITICAL HOMOGAMY IN GREAT BRITAIN 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Research focusing on the joint characteristics of spouses stretches back over 
five decades. Early studies demonstrated that there was a tendency towards 
homogamy (i.e. like marrying like) for a variety of characteristics. More recent 
research has examined trends in educational, religious, class, social status and 
ethnic homogamy (Penn & Dawkins, 1983; Ultee & Luijkx, 1990; Mare, 
1991; Kalmijn, 1991a; 1991b; 1994; Lampard, 1992; Stier and Shavit, 1994). 
Some pieces of recent research have focused on marital status and party 
politics (e.g. Kingston & Finkel, 1987; Plutzer & McBurnett, 1991). Other 
researchers have examined the effects of spouses' socio-economic 
characteristics on their political partisanship and voting behaviour (De Graaf 
and Heath, 1992; Hayes and Jones, 1992). However, while Huckfeldt and 
Sprague (1991) note that the analysis of political influence between spouses is 
worthy of extended attention, little research has been done on party political 
homogamy, i.e. the extent to which marriage partners have the same party 
political identification and/or vote the same way (though see Brickell et al., 
1988). This may reflect a shortage of data corresponding to samples of couples 
as opposed to samples of married individuals. 
In addition to its relevance to the discipline of political science, party 
political homogamy is also of theoretical interest in the context of theories 
relating to the origins and consequences of homogamy and heterogamy. 
Heterogamy (i.e. the marriage of dissimilar spouses) has often been viewed as 
a source of marital instability, despite a shortage of empirical evidence in 
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support of this hypothesis (Glenn et al, 1974). The hypothesis that party 
political heterogamy generates marital conflict would seem as plausible as any 
other hypothesis focusing on a specific form of heterogamy. 
Turning to the origins of homogamy, a number of different explanations 
have been put forward for the tendency of spouses to be similar to each other 
across a wide range of different characteristics. These explanations can be 
divided into three broad categories: cultural explanations, economic or utility-
maximisation explanations, and explanations focusing on demographic 
constraints. All these forms of explanation are evident, whether explicitly or 
implicitly, in the recent homogamy-related work of Kalmijn, whose theoretical 
discussions involve references to cultural matching, economic competition, 
preferences, opportunities and constraints (Kalmijn, 1991a; 1991b; 1994). 
 
Theoretical Explanations of Homogamy 
The first type of explanation is one which was implicitly prevalent in the first 
few decades of homogamy-related research. People were assumed to adhere to 
cultural norms which emphasised the negative and even stigmatic aspects of 
dissimilarity between spouses (e.g. Hollingshead, 1950; Kerckhoff, 1963). 
Economic explanations of homogamy followed on from the rise to 
prominence of rational-choice theory. The most notable proponent of this type 
of explanation of homogamy is Gary Becker (Becker, 1991). Essentially this 
theoretical perspective focuses on the personal, primarily economic, 
advantages gained by marrying a partner with specific characteristics. As such 
the first two types of explanation are not entirely distinct from each other, 
since gains and losses through adherence to or rejection of cultural norms 
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could be included within the framework of an economic cost-benefit analysis. 
In fact the overlap between the two types of explanation corresponds 
reasonably well to exchange theory (Blau, 1964), which is rather more 
sociologically-orientated than Becker's ideas. 
Becker showed that assortative mating for socio-economic 
characteristics can be seen as a consequence of competition within the 
marriage market for spouses with desirable (i.e. high) levels of economic 
resources. The same logic cannot be used to explain party political 
homogamy, since it is not simply a by-product of socio-economic homogamy, 
and since the costs or benefits of a spouse with a particular party political 
identification are primarily non-economic. Party political homogamy can be 
expected to play a positive role in reinforcing spouses' values and beliefs, 
whereas party political heterogamy can be expected to generate conflict, at the 
very least in those cases where the disparity is an extreme one. For this reason 
it is probably more appropriate to think in terms of utility maximisation 
explanations of party political homogamy rather than in terms of economic 
explanations. 
The final type of explanation is evident in two sets of published 
research. First, choice-based explanations of homogamy have been contrasted 
with constraint-based explanations in the debate sometimes referred to as 
`homogamy versus propinquity'. Various authors have attempted to ascribe at 
least a proportion of observed homogamy to geographical or spatial factors by 
asserting that residential and social segregation result in local marriage 
markets in which the pools of potential marriage partners are each more 
internally homogeneous than the pool of potential marriage partners in the 
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wider population. (Kerckhoff, 1963; Catton and Smircich, 1964; Ramsoy, 
1966; Peach, 1974; Morgan, 1981). Second, more overtly theoretical work by 
Blau has attempted to assess the impact of the distributions of people among 
social positions on their social relations (Blau, 1977: ix). This has led to more 
specific pieces of research examining the effects of the social composition of a 
population on intermarriage rates between the groups within it (Blau et al., 
1982; Blau et al., 1984). The important aspect of Blau's work is that it 
emphasises the role of strictly demographic aspects of social structure in 
determining patterns of social association. 
The dual aims of this paper are to document party political homogamy 
in Great Britain and to link the observed patterns to theoretical ideas relating 
to homogamy and heterogamy. The next section therefore uses the various 
theoretical explanations of the tendency towards homogamy to generate 
hypotheses relevant to the empirical analyses carried out in this paper. 
 
Hypotheses and Predictions relevant to the Empir ical Analyses in this 
paper . 
This section mirrors the structure of the later section devoted to analyses and 
results. The starting point of that section is an examination of the extent of 
homogamy of party political identification and of homogamy of voting 
intention. This is followed by a multivariate analysis examining the effects of 
various relevant factors on the likelihood of homogamy. 
One of these factors is strength of party political identification. While 
the theoretical explanations of homogamy would predict greater levels of party 
political homogamy than would be expected by chance, the theoretical 
 7 
explanations are a little less consistent in terms of what they would predict 
about the relationship between strength of party political identification and the 
extent of homogamy. The utility-maximisation explanation would predict a 
low level of homogamy among those with weak party political identifications 
and a high level of homogamy among those with strong party political 
identifications, since in terms of conflict avoidance and identity confirmation 
homogamy is of greater utility to the former than to the latter. The cultural 
explanation would predict a similar, though less marked, relationship, since 
people for whom politics are particularly salient may be more likely to 
conform to a norm of homogamy. The demographic explanation would predict 
a similar relationship if and only if individuals with stronger party political 
identifications move in significantly more homogeneous social circles than 
individuals with weaker party political identifications. 
The multivariate analysis also examines the extent to which the children 
of parents who are heterogamous in terms of party political identification 
follow in their parents' footsteps. The utility-maximisation explanation of 
homogamy would seem to imply that the children of such parents should be 
disproportionately homogamous, since any experience of parental conflict due 
to heterogamy should predispose the children against heterogamy. Conversely, 
the cultural explanation of homogamy would suggest that these children 
should be disproportionately heterogamous, since their parents' marriages do 
not reinforce the cultural norm. The implications of the demographic 
explanation in this context are unclear, though arguably one might expect the 
children to move in similar social circles to their parents and hence have a 
similar tendency towards homogamy or heterogamy. 
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A third factor considered in the multivariate analysis is age. A 
relationship between age and the extent of party political homogamy could 
reflect the implications of the various explanations of homogamy in a number 
of ways. Increasing homogamy with age could reflect a decline in the strength 
of the cultural norm of homogamy, or an attempt by some partners in 
heterogamous marriages to conform to this cultural norm by adopting the 
party political identification of their spouses. It could also relate to the 
dissolution of low utility heterogamous marriages, or to a pragmatic attempt 
by some partners within heterogamous couples to reduce conflict by moving 
in the political direction of their spouses. A demographic explanation of such a 
relationship would need to involve a trend in the internal party political 
homogeneity of the social circles into which society is divided, unless the 
trend related to the different levels of homogamy induced by the different 
demographic constraints of the marriage market and the remarriage market. 
A fourth factor considered in the multivariate analysis is `marital status' 
(i.e. dating; cohabiting; legally married). A relationship between marital status 
and the extent of homogamy could reflect the greater extent to which a 
cultural norm of homogamy might apply to legal marriages, or to the greater 
reduction in utility attached to conflict and lack of value reinforcement in a 
`longer-term' relationship than in a `shorter-term' one. It is not obvious why 
the tendency towards homogamy induced by demographic constraints should 
vary with marital status; however demographic explanations of homogamy 
might be pertinent to any relationship between age at marriage and 
homogamy, since the homogeneity of the social circles that one moves in may 
vary over one's life-cycle. Marriages at young ages might also be expected to 
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conform less to a cultural norm of homogamy than marriages at older ages; 
they might also be marked by a tendency to assess the utility of relationships 
less accurately, which would result in a higher level of heterogamy (Becker, 
1991). 
A separate analysis in the empirical section of this paper considers party 
political homogamy in comparison with party political similarity in the context 
of other social relationships. If British society is to some extent stratified along 
party political lines, whether as a result of individual choices or simply as a 
result of the political homogeneity of particular social contexts, one would 
expect party political similarities between friends, co-workers, neighbours, etc. 
One would also expect some degree of party political homogeneity within 
families because of socialization, common economic situations, etc. The 
demographic explanation of party political homogamy would predict that 
individuals would have levels of party political similarity to their spouses 
comparable with their levels of similarity to other people within their social 
circles. The cultural and utility-maximisation explanations of homogamy 
would both predict that levels of similarity between spouses would be higher 
than levels of similarity between neighbours, friends, etc., because the cultural 
norm of homogamy would rule out the politically dissimilar members of the 
social circles that an individual moves in as potential spouses, and because the 
loss of utility attached to conflict with a spouse, and the gain in utility through 
consensus with a spouse, would be greater than the corresponding losses and 
gains resulting from party political dissimilarity and similarity within other 
forms of relationship. 
The last set of empirical analyses in this paper focus on the possible 
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linkage between homogamy and marital success. One issue of interest in this 
context is the extent to which the population perceives agreement on politics 
as being important for a successful marriage. The cultural explanation of 
homogamy would, of course, predict that a high proportion of the population 
would see agreement on politics as important in this context. It is less clear 
whether the utility-maximisation explanation would predict this, as the 
decision to carry on or to end a relationship which might become a marriage-
type relationship may not consciously involve a recognition of the role of 
party politics in generating conflict or strengthening consensus. The 
demographic explanation would not in itself predict that agreement on politics 
would be perceived to be important to a successful marriage. 
The final analysis in this paper focuses on differences in the extent of 
homogamy between first marriages and remarriages. All three explanations of 
homogamy are potentially relevant in this context. The cultural explanation 
can be argued to predict greater heterogamy in remarriages, since the divorced 
have failed to adhere to another marriage-related norm, i.e. life-long marriage. 
The utility-maximisation explanation is ambiguous in its predictions, since on 
one hand people marrying for a second time may be more careful in their 
assessment of the utility of the relationships, but on the other hand these 
people may be disproportionately poor at correctly assessing the utility of 
relationships, and hence may be inclined to enter into fragile, heterogamous 
marriages. The demographic explanation would predict differential levels of 
homogamy in relation to the relative levels of party political homogeneity of 
social circles within the marriage and remarriage markets; since the remarriage 
market is likely to be more fragmented and to involve a smaller proportion of 
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the population, remarriages might be expected to be more heterogamous than 
first marriages. 
To conclude this section, it is important to note that the degree of 
overlap between the predictions based on the various explanations of 
homogamy means that assessing their relative merits is likely to be difficult. 
However, by carrying out a range of empirical analyses it may be possible to 
generate evidence which suggests that one or more of the explanations are 
correct and are of particular importance. 
 
DATA SOURCES 
This paper uses data from a number of sources. The 1987 British General 
Election Survey (BES) surveyed a stratified multi-stage random sample of 
British adults aged 18 or over living in private households. Fieldwork was 
carried out from June to September 1987, and a 70% response rate gave rise to 
an achieved sample size of 3,826 (see Heath et al., 1991: 230-234). The 1992 
British General Election Survey (see Heath et al., 1993) is also used in this 
paper to check the validity of the data used from the 1987 survey. 
The 1986 British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) also surveyed a 
stratified multi-stage random sample of British adults aged 18 or over living in 
private households. Fieldwork was carried out in April to May 1986, and a 
70% response rate led to an achieved sample size of 3,100 (see Jowell et al., 
1987: 187-194). 
The 1986 ESRC Social Change and Economic Life Initiative (SCELI) 
work attitudes\histories survey surveyed random samples of adults aged 
between 20 and 60 in the non-institutional populations of six urban local 
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labour markets in Britain (Aberdeen, Coventry, Kirkcaldy, Northampton, 
Rochdale and Swindon). Fieldwork was carried out in June to November 1986 
and a 76% response rate led to an achieved sample size of 6,111. The SCELI 
Household and Community Survey was a follow-up survey of a subset of 
these respondents. In this second survey, where applicable, a range of 
questions was asked of the respondent's partner as well as of the original 
respondent. Fieldwork was carried out between March and July 1987, and the 
response rate of this follow-up survey was 76%, leading to a sample size of 
1,816, of whom 1,218 were living in partnerships (see Gallie, Marsh and 
Vogler, 1994: 337-346). 
All three of the above surveys used the electoral register as their 
sampling frame, and in each case the survey data have been deposited at, and 
are available from, the ESRC Data Archive at the University of Essex. 
The BES collected data about the party political identifications both of 
its respondents and of some of their partners. However, there are two major 
limitations to these data. First, the data relating to respondents' partners were 
collected by a series of questions which were geared towards identifying the 
party political identifications of the two people with whom each respondent 
discussed politics most often during the 1987 General Election campaign. 
Consequently, if a respondent's partner was not one of these two people, no 
data were collected about the partner's party political identification. Second, 
the accuracy of the data collected depends on whether the respondent was 
aware of and reported correctly their partner's party political identification. 
Thus analyses of the BES data need to be supported by evidence from 
other sources which indicate that the data are adequately representative and of 
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adequate validity, e.g. data from the SCELI Household and Community 
Survey, which collected data on the voting intentions of a sample of 
respondents and their partners in separate self-completion booklets, with no 
collaboration being allowed between partners. 
The SCELI data are themselves limited, since, while the BES was a 
nationally representative survey, SCELI focused on six specific study areas. 
However, a comparison of the data from the two sources goes some way 
towards establishing whether the BES data are adequately representative and 
of adequate validity. 
Further details of the key questions from these surveys are given in 
footnotes to the tables. In addition to data on party political identifications and 
voting intentions from the BES and SCELI surveys, marriage-related 
attitudinal data from the 1986 BSAS are also used in this paper. 
It is worth noting that the data sources used in this paper are not ideal 
for the examination of party political homogamy for a number of reasons. 
First, only limited data are available relating to respondents' partners. As a 
consequence it is not possible to look at the relationship between party 
political homogamy and various other forms of homogamy. In addition, in 
some of the analyses in this paper where an independent variable relates to the 
respondent it would be useful to have a measure of the same variable for the 
respondent's partner (e.g. when looking at the effect of strength of party 
political identification on the probability of party political homogamy). 
Second, the BES data do not allow one to distinguish between first marriages 
and remarriages. The SCELI data allow one to do this, but do not include data 
on the previous spouses of remarried respondents. Finally, and most 
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importantly, the data sources are cross-sectional surveys which collected 
limited retrospective data and as such are limited in what they can show about 
age and cohort effects. There is no way of telling whether a couple who are 
currently homogamous for party political identification were homogamous in 
this respect at the time of their marriage. This issue will be returned to later in 
this paper. 
 
METHODS, ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
This section presents empirical analyses relating to party political homogamy 
in Great Britain. First, the extent of such homogamy is documented. A 
multivariate analysis looking at the effects of various pertinent factors on the 
likelihood of heterogamy\homogamy is then presented. This is followed by a 
comparison between party political homogamy and party political similarity 
within other social relationships. Finally, analyses relevant to the possible 
relationship between party political homogamy and marital success are 
presented. 
In addition to the use of odds ratios as measures of association, the 
analyses in this paper involve the use of logistic regressions and hierarchical 
log-linear models (Gilbert, 1993). The log-linear models were fitted using 
GLIM (see Francis, Green and Payne, 1993), and the logistic regressions were 
carried out using SPSS for Windows (Norusis, 1993). 
In order to keep this paper reasonably accessible, the findings are to a 
large extent presented in the form of cross-tabulations and percentages rather 
than parameter estimates. However, since some of the factors affecting the 
likelihood of party political homogamy are correlated, a multivariate analysis 
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(specifically in this case a logistic regression) is needed to check that each 
factor still has an effect when the other factors are controlled for. A 
multivariate analysis also allows any effects of social class and education to be 
identified and accounted for; note that some evidence exists that graduate 
couples may be unusually homogamous (Lampard, 1992). 
An examination of party political homogamy might have been expected 
to have utilised even more elaborate multivariate analyses than those used in 
this paper. Recent work on assortative mating has shown how it can be useful 
to consider the overlap between different forms of homogamy (Kalmijn, 
1991a; 1991b; 1994). However, the data sources used in this paper only allow 
the relationship between party political homogamy and occupational class 
homogamy to be examined. 
More complicated multivariate models would have also been useful if 
the data sources available had permitted a sophisticated analysis of the effects 
of marriage duration, marriage cohort and period on the level of party political 
homogamy. However, the data sources used in this paper did not permit such 
an analysis. 
 
 16 
The Extent of Par ty Political Homogamy 
2,606 of the BES respondents were married or living as married. Of these, 
1,677 (64%) reported that their partner was one of the two people with whom 
they discussed politics the most during the 1987 general election campaign. Of 
the other 929 respondents, 461 (18% of the total sample) reported not having 
discussed politics with anybody during the election campaign and the 
remaining 468 (18% of the total sample) reported having discussed politics 
with somebody during the election campaign, but reported that their partner 
was not one of the two people with whom they discussed politics the most. 
Overall, of the 2,145 respondents who reported discussing politics with 
someone
In addition to the married or cohabiting respondents, 109 other 
respondents reported that their partner was one of the two people with whom 
they discussed politics the most during the election campaign. This included a 
small number of people whose marriages had since ended, but mainly 
consisted of respondents who were part of couple relationships but were not 
married to or living with their partners. Overall, data were collected by the 
BES on the party political identifications of 1,786 couples. 
 during the election campaign, 1,677 (78%) reported that their partner 
was one of the two people with whom they discussed politics the most. 
As will be shown later in this paper, the marital status of couples is 
related to the level of homogamy observed. However, restricting attention to 
legally married couples, or to couples who were living together, has a minimal 
effect on the results of the other analyses in this paper, and the analyses 
involving the BES data are therefore based on all the available couples. 
Contemporary party politics in Britain has been dominated by the (right-
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wing) Conservative party and the (left-wing) Labour party, with a third party, 
or alliance of parties, occupying the political middle ground. In this paper the 
`Alliance' between the Liberal and Social Democratic parties is treated as a 
single party. 
In 1,591 (89%) of the BES couples both partners identified with one of 
the three `main' British political parties, though not necessarily the same party. 
In 47 (3%) of the couples one partner identified with one of the three `main' 
parties and the other identified with another party. In 11 (1%) of the couples 
both partners identified with the same, `minor' party. In the remaining 137 
(8%) of the couples, one or both partners did not identify with any party, or 
refused to answer the relevant question. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Table 1 shows partners' party political identifications in combination for the 
1,591 couples where both partners identified with one of the three `main' 
parties. In over three-quarters of the couples the partners both identified with 
the same party, and in only one in fourteen couples is there a 
Labour/Conservative disparity. (If there had been no relationship between 
partners' party political identifications these figures would have been just over 
a third and one in five respectively). 
Odds ratios can be used to summarise the strength of the relationship 
between partners' party political identifications. Restricting attention to 
couples involving Conservative identifiers and Alliance identifiers, the odds 
ratio is (641x203)/(86x77) = 19.7. Restricting attention to couples involving 
Labour identifiers and Alliance identifiers, the odds ratio is (370x203)/(62x36) 
= 33.7. Finally, restricting attention to couples involving Conservative 
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identifiers and Labour identifiers, the odds ratio is (641x370)/(48x68) = 72.7. 
Thus the implicit `distance' between the Labour Party and the Conservative 
Party is greater than the distances between either of these two parties and the 
Alliance, with the distance between the Conservative party and the Alliance 
being somewhat smaller than the distance between the Labour Party and the 
Alliance. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
An examination of data from SCELI can be used as a partial check of the 
validity and representativeness of the BES data on party political homogamy. 
Table 2 shows partners' voting intentions in combination for a sample of 738 
SCELI respondents and their partners. (Attention is restricted to couples where 
both partners intended voting for one of the three `main' parties). As in Table 
1, in about three-quarters of the couples both partners `supported' the same 
party. Rather more couples than in Table 1 were Labour/Alliance or 
Conservative/Alliance, but this is primarily a consequence of the greater level 
of support for the Alliance (i.e. about 10% higher) in the SCELI sample than 
in the BES sample. 
This difference in the level of Alliance support could be a consequence 
of the timing of the two surveys, or of the different target populations, or of 
the difference between identifying with a party and intending to vote for it! A 
more important issue is whether the patterns of association in Tables 1 and 2 
differ, once the spread of support across the parties has been taken into 
account. This can be checked by the calculation of the three odds ratios for 
Table 2 that were previously calculated for Table 1. The 
Conservative/Alliance odds ratio is (201x158)/(41x49) = 15.8; the 
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Labour/Alliance odds ratio is (193x158)/(35x30) = 29.0; and the 
Labour/Conservative odds ratio is (201x193)/(18x13) = 165.8. Hence the first 
two SCELI odds ratios are very similar to those from the BES sample, 
whereas the third SCELI odds ratio is considerably larger than that from the 
BES sample. This reflects the small number of Labour/Conservative couples 
in the SCELI sample (4% of all couples, as opposed to 7% of all couples in the 
BES sample). 
Tables 1 and 2 were combined to give a three-way table of husband's 
party by wife's party by survey. Log-linear models fitted to this table showed 
that both the distribution of support across the three parties and the frequency 
of Labour/Conservative and Conservative/Labour couples (given the 
distribution of support across the parties) varied significantly between the BES 
and SCELI samples (p<.001 and p<.05 respectively). 
Why should there have been significantly fewer Labour/Conservative 
disparities in the SCELI sample? One possibility is that partners' voting 
intentions are more similar than their party political identifications as a 
consequence of tactical voting. Another is that it is a reflection of peculiarities 
of the SCELI study areas, though an examination of the part of the BES 
sample corresponding geographically to the SCELI study areas indicated that 
if anything the level of heterogamy should have been higher in the SCELI 
sample than in the BES sample. Finally, the greater level of support for the 
Alliance in the SCELI sample may indicate that some couples who would 
have appeared as Labour/Conservative or Conservative/Labour in the BES 
sample appeared in the SCELI sample as Labour/Alliance or 
Alliance/Conservative. (This is consistent with the slightly lower odds ratios 
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for these two disparities in the SCELI sample as compared to the BES 
sample). 
While some BES respondents belonging to heterogamous couples may 
have erroneously reported their spouses as having the same party political 
identifications as themselves, the fact that the frequency of 
Labour/Conservative disparities in the SCELI sample was significantly lower 
than in the BES sample suggests that the BES sample probably does not suffer 
much from this form of bias. Similarly, the lower frequency of disparities in 
the SCELI sample suggests that the BES sample is not seriously biased by a 
tendency for heterogamous couples to avoid discussing party politics. 
In fact, more direct evidence is available in relation to this last point. 
Rather than asking about the two people that each respondent discussed 
politics with most often, the 1992 British General Election Survey asked 
which two people each respondent discussed important matters with the most, 
and later asked how often the respondent talked about politics with each of 
these two people. By focusing on those respondents for whom one of the two 
people was their spouse\partner it is possible to look at the relationship 
between party political homogamy\heterogamy and frequency of discussing 
politics. 
In fact, 22% of homogamous respondents reported seldom or never 
talking about politics with their partners, as opposed to 20% of heterogamous 
respondents, which suggests that the 1987 BES sample is not biased by a 
disproportionate exclusion of heterogamous couples as a consequence of its 
restriction to couples who discussed politics during the Election campaign. 
Analyses of the 929 married/cohabiting BES respondents for whom data 
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on spouse's party political identification were not collected showed that the 
sample of 1,677 BES respondents for whom these data were collected under-
represented Labour identifiers, those who did not identify with a party, and 
those whose party political identifications were not very strong. The next 
section shows that respondents in the last category are disproportionately 
likely to be heterogamous, hence the sample of 1,677 couples probably 
slightly under-represents heterogamous couples. However, an examination of 
the magnitude of the relationship between strength of party political 
identification and party political homogamy, and of the level of under-
representation of respondents whose party political identifications were not 
very strong, indicates that the likely shortfall only constitutes 1% to 2% of 
heterogamous couples, i.e. about half-a-dozen cases. 
 
A Multivar iate Analysis of Par ty Political Homogamy 
The next few sections discuss the results of logistic regressions with party 
political homogamy\heterogamy as the binary dependent variable (heterogamy 
= 1; homogamy = 0) and various relevant factors as independent variables. 
Table 3 shows the results for all 1,591 respondents in Table 1; Table 4 shows 
the results when attention was restricted to respondents who were Labour or 
Conservative identifiers and who had Labour or Conservative partners. Data 
for quite large numbers of respondents were missing for one or more of the 
independent variables, thus in order to avoid a markedly reduced sample size 
categories such as `not given' or `unknown' were used for some of the 
independent variables. 
It can be seen from Tables 3 and 4 that the effects of the social class and 
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education variables are not statistically significant. Social class was based on 
respondent's own occupation and was operationalized using a collapsed 
version of the Goldthorpe class schema (Heath et al., 1991: 66), the classes 
used being a `salariat', routine non-manual workers, the `petty bourgeoisie', 
foremen and technicians, and a `working class'. Class heterogamy 
(operationalized as one partner in the salariat and one in the working class) 
can be seen from Tables 3 and 4 to have a statistically insignificant effect. The 
education variable was based on highest qualification. 
TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Homogamy and Strength of Par ty Political Identification 
It can be seen from Table 3 that the strength of a respondent's party political 
identification has a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of 
homogamy. The tendency towards heterogamy increases markedly as the 
strength of the respondent's party political identification decreases. 
The relevant parameter estimates in Table 3 are very similar to those 
obtained in a bivariate analysis of the relationship between party political 
homogamy and strength of respondent's party political identification. A more 
detailed discussion of this relationship therefore follows. 
Table 5 shows the relationship between strength of respondent's party 
political identification and partners' party political identifications in 
combination 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
The proportion of couples who are heterogamous is over three times as 
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large for respondents whose party political identification was not very strong 
as for respondents whose party political identification was very strong. The 
trend is similar for all three types of heterogamous couple. The 
Labour/Conservative odds ratios for respondents with party political 
identifications which are not very strong, fairly strong, and very strong are 
(124x70)/(16x35) = 15.5, (315x180)/(24x25) = 94.5, and (165x96)/(7x4) = 
565.7 respectively. 
In nearly half of the heterogamous couples in Table 5 the respondent's 
party political identification is not very strong, whereas the respondent's party 
political identification is very strong in less than a tenth of the heterogamous 
couples. (Among homogamous couples about a quarter of the respondents had 
very strong party political identifications and about a quarter had party 
political identifications that were not very strong). 
Even where the respondent's party political identification is not very 
strong there is still nearly twice as high a proportion of homogamous couples 
as there would be if there were no relationship between partners' party political 
identifications. To some extent this may reflect the strengths of the 
respondents' spouses' party political identifications. However, taking the 
proportion at face value, it suggests that there is a tendency towards 
homogamy which is not a result of individuals consciously `choosing' a 
politically similar partner. Conversely, the variation in heterogamy according 
to the strength of the respondent's party political identification visible in Table 
5 suggests that much of the tendency towards homogamy is a result of 
conscious choice. 
Returning to Table 3, the parameter estimates for turnout provide 
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statistically significant evidence that heterogamy is disproportionately 
frequent among people who do not vote. (The variable relates to actual rather 
than stated voting behaviour; see Swaddle and Heath, 1989). In the BES 
sample 34% of married non-voters were heterogamous, as opposed to 23% of 
married voters (Lampard, 1992). Once again, this is consistent with the 
hypothesis that party political homogamy/heterogamy is related to the degree 
of salience of party politics to the respondent. 
In the vast majority of heterogamous couples the respondent does not 
identify very strongly with a party, which suggests that the heterogamy may 
not be a problem for the couple. However, conflict is more likely where one 
partner objects to the party that the other partner identifies with, hence it is not 
so much the strength of the respondent's party political identification which is 
of relevance as their attitude towards the party their partner identifies with. 
The BES collected data on whether respondents were `against' specific 
parties. In heterogamous marriages between Labour and Conservative 
identifiers, 52% (60/116) of respondents were against their partner's party. 
However, the percentage of respondents who were against their partner's party 
was much lower for heterogamous marriages involving Alliance identifiers, 
being 18% (46/261). This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
Labour/Conservative heterogamous marriages are likely to involve the most 
conflict and be the most unstable. Furthermore, only 4% (11/261) of 
respondents in heterogamous marriages involving an Alliance identifier were 
strongly
Since Labour\Conservative heterogamy appears to be more potentially 
 against the party their partner identified with, whereas the 
corresponding figure for Labour/Conservative marriages was 20% (23/116). 
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problematic than other forms of party political heterogamy, the analyses in the 
rest of this paper focus where possible on Labour\Conservative heterogamy as 
well as considering party political heterogamy more broadly. 
Overall, the respondent was against the party that their partner identified 
with in less than one in three of the heterogamous couples in Table 1, and was 
only strongly against their partner's party in about one in eleven of the 
heterogamous couples. 
Hence, if one assumes that party political differences between spouses 
are only likely to be problematic in couples where one or both partners is 
against the other's party, party political differences are likely to cause 
problems in no more than about one in three heterogamous couples, though 
this figure is likely to be a slight underestimate, as it does not take account of 
couples where the respondent is not against their partner's party, but where the 
respondent's partner is against the respondent's party). 
 
The Intergenerational Transmission of Heterogamy 
The BES collected data from its respondents on the voting behaviour of their 
parents when the respondents were growing up. This allows one to test the 
hypothesis that the children of heterogamous parents are more heterogamous 
than the children of homogamous parents. 
Of the 1,591 respondents in the sub-sample of the BES on which Table 
1 was based, 1,217 reported both their parents as having usually voted for one 
of the three main parties. The overall percentage of homogamous sets of 
parents is 88.3% (1,075/1,217), as compared to 76.3% of the couples in Table 
1. This may indicate that some respondents were misrepresenting the voting 
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behaviour of their parents. However, the odds ratio corresponding to 
Labour/Conservative homogamy/heterogamy among the parents is 
(393x610)/(31x58) = 133.3, which is similar to the corresponding odds ratios 
in Tables 1 and 2. The difference between the parents and the couples in 
Tables 1 and 2 probably reflects the fact that the Alliance in 1987 was a much 
more heterogeneous entity than its predecessor the Liberal party had been in 
preceding decades. 
32% (46/142) of those BES respondents who reported their parents as 
having been heterogamous were heterogamous, compared with 23% 
(246/1,075) of respondents with homogamous parents. However, the relevant 
parameter estimate in Table 3 is consistent with a percentage difference of this 
magnitude and demonstrates that parental heterogamy still significantly 
increases the likelihood of heterogamy net of the other independent variables 
in the logistic regression. (Note that the corresponding parameter estimate in 
Table 4, though not quite statistically significant, is marginally greater in 
magnitude). The inclusion of these other variables in the multivariate analysis 
rules out some of the most obvious explanations of the intergenerational 
transmission of party political homogamy. 
Heterogamous parents might be expected to be less strong than average 
in their political identifications, and to have an `aggregate' political 
identification which is towards the centre of a `Left'/`Right' political 
dimension. Two reasonable assumptions about the children of heterogamous 
parents follow on from this. First, it seems reasonable to assume that a child of 
a heterogamous couple is likely to be a less strong supporter of the party they 
identify with than a child of a homogamous couple. The results from the 
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earlier section on homogamy/heterogamy and strength of party political 
identification would then suggest that the first child was more likely to be in a 
heterogamous marriage. The second reasonable assumption is that a child of a 
heterogamous couple is more likely to be an Alliance identifier than a child of 
a homogamous couple, and Alliance identifiers are more likely to be in 
heterogamous marriages, hence the first child is more likely to be in a 
heterogamous marriage. Thus there are two fairly straightforward but rather 
uninteresting ways of explaining the intergenerational transmission of 
heterogamy. 
However, the inclusion of party political identification and strength of 
party political identification in the logistic regression demonstrates that the 
intergenerational transmission of heterogamy cannot be explained in these 
ways. 
The statistically significant parameter estimate from the logistic 
regression is consistent, however, with the hypothesis is that the children of 
party politically heterogamous parents are simply more likely to see party 
political heterogamy as acceptable, possibly because they do not see party 
politics as of salience in the marital context even if they see it as salient in 
other contexts. 
The above findings are relevant to more general considerations of the 
intergenerational transmission of political attitudes, as they provide some 
support for the idea that such attitudes are in part culturally determined rather 
than simply reflecting rational economic choices (Butler and Stokes, 1974; 
Himmelweit et al., 1981). 
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Homogamy, Age and Mar ital Status 
It was noted in the last section that it is possible that respondents' parents were 
more homogamous than the respondents were. If a trend towards less 
homogamy exists, then one would expect there to be a relationship between 
party political homogamy and respondent's age. There is the standard problem 
of distinguishing between age and cohort effects, which will be discussed in 
more detail a little later. Note that respondent's age is wife's age in some cases 
and husband's age in others; though this is not ideal the similarity of spouses' 
ages on average means that it is not a serious problem. 
The parameter estimate corresponding to respondent's age in Table 3 
shows that respondent's age does not have a statistically significant effect on 
the overall likelihood of heterogamy, but the corresponding parameter 
estimate in Table 4 shows that respondent's age just has a significant effect on 
the likelihood of Labour\Conservative heterogamy. This sole age-related 
effect corresponds to a dichotomy contrasting respondents aged under 35 years 
with those aged 35 or more years. 
52 out of 442 (12%) of the respondents aged under 35 in Table 4 are 
Labour/Conservative heterogamous, as compared to 64 out of 1,149 (6%) of 
the respondents aged 35 or over. Note that some of this percentage difference 
is spurious since it is induced by correlations between respondent's age and 
respondent's strength of party political identification and between respondent's 
age and respondent's marital status. The corresponding figures for other forms 
of heterogamy are 78 out of 442 (18%) and 183 out of 1,149 (16%). 
The statistically significant relationship between respondent's age and 
Labour\Conservative heterogamy evident from the parameter estimate in 
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Table 4 could be a reflection of three distinct time-related processes, which are 
difficult to distinguish between given the cross-sectional nature of the data. 
First, the relationship between age and Labour/Conservative heterogamy may 
reflect a trend across marriage cohorts towards greater heterogamy at the time 
of marriage. Second, it may reflect a tendency for couples within a marriage 
cohort to become less heterogamous with increasing marriage duration, i.e. as 
their marriages `age'. This decrease in heterogamy with increasing marriage 
duration has often been hypothesised to occur in the context of spouses' 
religions, though Kalmijn found no evidence in his research that this was the 
case (Kalmijn, 1991b). Finally, the excess of Labour/Conservative marriages 
at younger ages may be due to differential attrition within marriage cohorts, 
i.e. politically heterogamous marriages may be more likely to end in divorce. 
Overall, the observed relationship is consistent with a relatively recent 
increase in Labour\Conservative heterogamy at marriage, or a relatively quick 
convergence of the political identifications of some heterogamous couples as 
their marriages progress, or the relatively rapid dissolution of the marriages of 
some heterogamous couples (or a combination of the three possibilities). Note 
that the latter two possibilities both imply that Labour\Conservative marriages 
are `problematic'; arguably the first possibility requires an unsatisfactorily 
abrupt change in marriage patterns. 
One plausible hypothesis relating to the final possibility is that the 
excess of heterogamous marriages among respondents under 35 is due to 
`hasty' marriages at an early age which will eventually end in divorce (cf 
Kiernan, 1986). However, if anything, marriages at an early age seem to be 
associated with increased homogamy, since 16% (18/110) of the couples in the 
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SCELI sample where the respondent had married as a teenager were 
heterogamous, as opposed to 26% (134/515) of the couples where the 
respondent had married in their twenties or later (p<.05). 
Marriages at an early age may be unusually homogamous because the 
`social circles' that people move in at a young age are more homogeneous with 
respect to party politics than those they encounter later in their adult lives. 
Mare has suggested a similar relationship in the context of educational 
homogamy (Mare, 1991: 16). A later section considers the relationship 
between homogamy and social context in more detail. 
As noted earlier in this section, the crude relationship between age and 
homogamy/heterogamy partly reflects a relationship between marital status 
and homogamy/heterogamy. Of the 1,591 couples in Table 1, 59 were 
cohabiting and a further 69 were neither legally married nor cohabiting. (In 
addition to this, 18 respondents who discussed politics with their partner 
during the election campaign were widowed, divorced or separated at the time 
they were interviewed). 
The relevant parameter estimates in Table 3 show that the general level 
of heterogamy is significantly higher among unmarried/non-cohabiting 
couples than among cohabiting couples and legally married couples. The 
parameter estimate corresponding to unmarried/non-cohabiting couples in 
Table 4 is not quite statistically significant but is of a similar magnitude to the 
corresponding, statistically significant, parameter estimate in Table 3. 
The higher level of heterogamy among couples who are not legally 
married and who do not live together is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
importance of shared political views becomes greater as the level of 
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commitment in a relationship increases. Thus it may be that people are more 
willing to `date' people who do not share their political views than they are to 
marry/live with them. 
 
Homogamy and Social Context 
It is not just marriage partners who are similar in party political terms. Is the 
high level of party political homogamy simply a reflection of the party 
political homogeneity of the `social circles' in which people live? An analysis 
of BES data can go some way towards answering this question. The data on 
party political homogamy/heterogamy came from a question looking at the 
party political identifications of the two people with whom respondents 
discussed politics the most during the election campaign; this question can 
also provide evidence of respondents' party political similarity to members of 
their families, co-workers, neighbours and friends. 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
Table 6 shows the relationship between respondents' party political 
identifications and the party political identifications of individuals belonging 
to various categories of relatives/friends/acquaintances. (As in the previous 
analyses attention is restricted to cases where both individuals identified with 
one of the `main' three parties). Each of the sub-tables only corresponds to a 
sub-sample of the overall BES sample. There is no guarantee that the relevant 
sub-sample is at all representative of the broader sample, or that the sub-tables 
are at all representative of the respondents' relatives/friends/acquaintances in 
general. Respondents may have been disproportionately likely (or 
disproportionately unlikely) to have discussed politics the most during the 
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Election Campaign with people who shared their party political views. Thus 
the findings that follow are based on the assumption that the data in Table 6 
are not fatally biased. 
The level of party political homogamy in Table 1 (76%) is much the 
same as the level of party political similarity visible in Table 6 between 
respondents and other members of their families living in the same household 
(73%), though the percentage of Labour/Conservative disparities is rather 
higher in the first sub-table of Table 6 than it was in Table 1 (11% as 
compared with 7%). However, fewer respondents (63%) were similar to 
members of their families who were not
The level of similarity of respondents to their neighbours (65%) was 
much the same as the level of similarity of respondents to members of their 
families who were not living in their households. However, the corresponding 
figure for co-workers was much lower than this (49%). The level of similarity 
of respondents to friends who were not relatives or neighbours or co-workers 
(57%) was also quite low relative to the level of party political homogamy in 
Table 1. 
 living in their households. 
The high level of similarity of respondents to other family members 
living in the same household probably reflects the `closeness' of the 
relationships involved, e.g. parent/child, respondent/sibling. The levels of 
similarity in the other four sub-tables of Table 6 are probably more 
representative of the level of similarity of respondents to the generality of 
individuals in the respondents' `social circles'. 
Focusing on the Labour and Conservative identifiers in each sub-table, 
the odds ratios corresponding to the neighbours, co-workers and other friends 
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sub-tables are (76x45)/(10x22) = 15.5, (147x124)/(77x58) = 4.1, and 
(166x125)/(65x35) = 9.1 respectively, as compared to an odds ratio of 72.7 in 
Table 1. Thus some of the tendency towards party political homogamy is not 
explained by the general level of party political similarity of respondents to the 
people in the `social circles' that they move in. An important part of the 
tendency to party political homogamy appears to be a tendency for individuals 
to choose
Conversely, the levels of similarity obtained from the sub-tables of 
Table 6 suggest that there are structural effects which to an extent lead to party 
political homogamy. Of course, individuals exercise a certain amount of 
control over who their neighbours, co-workers and other friends are but 
decisions leading to individuals moving in particular `social circles' are 
probably largely based on factors other than the individual's perception of the 
party political views of the people within those social circles, and the party 
political homogeneity of many `social circles' is not something over which 
individuals can exert much control. 
 a partner whose party political views match their own. The data in 
Table 6 suggest that it is implausible that the observed level of party political 
homogamy is entirely a consequence of structural constraints. 
Note that the above discussion hinges on the assumption that the data 
analysed are adequately representative of the `social circles' within which the 
respondents move. 
The above findings are consistent with the view of Huckfeldt and 
Sprague that the relationship between individual political attitudes and the 
prevalent political attitudes in a locality reflect both individual choices and 
structural constraints (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1991; Huckfeldt, Plutzer and 
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Sprague, 1993). 
 
Homogamy and Mar ital Success 
While heterogamy is often thought to reduce marital quality and/or increase 
marital instability, there is very little evidence to support this hypothesis, 
except in the case of age heterogamy (Lampard, 1992), and possibly 
educational heterogamy (Tzeng, 1992). However, BSAS data suggest that 
many people see homogamy as important to the success of a marriage. 
Respondents were provided with a list of factors which might affect the 
success of a marriage and were asked the question "How important is each one 
to a successful marriage?". Respondents could rate the factors as "Very 
Important", "Fairly Important", "Not Very Important" and "Not At All 
Important". Four of the listed factors were homogamy-related, i.e. "Tastes and 
interests in common", "Same social background", "Shared religious beliefs", 
and "Agreement on politics". 
"Agreement on politics" was rated as very or fairly important by 15% 
(239/1,552) of respondents. However, the corresponding figures for "Tastes 
and interests in common", "Same social background", and "Shared religious 
beliefs" were 79%, 48% and 37% respectively. Thus, though party political 
homogamy is even more common in Britain than homogamy of social origin, 
it is not seen as of the same degree of importance in the context of marital 
success. 
The above findings may reflect a public perception of politics as of little 
relevance to everyday life and social interactions. Thus while the party 
political homogamy evident in Table 1 reflects the underlying socio-political 
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values and beliefs of BES respondents and their partners, BSAS respondents 
may not have interpreted "agreement on politics" as meaning "agreement on 
attitudes towards important socio-political issues". Additionally, the `dire 
consequences' of religious intermarriage, marrying `cross-class', and marrying 
a spouse with different tastes and interests are probably more entrenched in 
British minds than the negative consequences of political differences between 
spouses are (possibly as a consequence of the infrequency of such political 
differences). 
54% (126/235) of BSAS respondents who saw "agreement on politics" 
as important saw all three other homogamy-related factors as important and 
hence believed similarity between spouses to be important in general. 
However, only 37% (126/339) of those respondents who saw all three other 
factors as important saw "agreement on politics" as important. BSAS data also 
show that there is virtually no variation in the percentage of respondents who 
see "agreement on politics" as important according to party political 
identification (with the figure falling into the range 14% to 17% for all three 
main parties). 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
More interesting, given this paper's earlier findings on trends in party political 
homogamy, is the relationship between age and attitude towards the 
importance of "agreement on politics". Table 7 shows that as age decreases so 
the perceived importance of "agreement on politics" decreases. A log-linear 
model fitted to Table 7 showed the relationship between age and this attitude 
to be statistically significant (p<.001). 
This finding probably does not explain the greater level of party 
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political heterogamy among the under 35's which was noted earlier in the 
paper, since the trend visible in Table 7 is spread across all four age 
categories. 
One hypothesis is that Table 7 provides evidence of a general decline in 
the perceived salience of a variety of factors which have historically structured 
social interactions such as marriage. There is only evidence that actual
Similar relationships exist in the BSAS data between age and the 
perceived importance of the other three marriage-related factors. The decline 
in importance is least evident for "Tastes and interests in common". 
 
salience has declined during the latter part of the 20th Century for a few of the 
various factors for which there is a tendency towards homogamy e.g. social 
origin, Christian denomination (Lampard, 1992). However, there is no reason 
why people should not be increasingly perceiving a factor as being of 
decreasing relevance, though its actual salience is static. 
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
SCELI collected rather more `concrete' data on the relationship between 
marital stability and party political homogamy/heterogamy. Table 8 compares 
homogamy/heterogamy of voting intention between respondents in their first 
marriages and respondents in their second (or later) marriages (following at 
least one divorce). 24% of the first marriages were heterogamous as compared 
with 31% of the remarriages. Log-linear models showed that this statistically 
significant difference (p<.001) is due to a disproportionate number of 
remarriages involving Labour/Conservative disparities. (13% of the 
remarriages involved Labour/Conservative disparities as opposed to 3% of the 
first marriages). 
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The above relationship may occur as a consequence of people who tend 
towards party political heterogamy having an unusually high risk of marital 
dissolution and hence being disproportionately represented among 
remarriages. Alternatively, remarriages may be more heterogamous as a 
consequence of a marriage market which makes homogamous marriages 
difficult to come by for the previously married (c.f. Dean & Gurak, 1978). 
Ideally, one would have access to data relating to 
homogamy\heterogamy in the first marriages of remarried people. This would 
allow one to distinguish between the two explanations offered above. 
However, it is very rare for surveys to collect retrospective data about 
respondents' ex-spouses. Note also that remarriages involve only a subset of 
those whose first marriages have ended. 
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SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Summary of findings 
This paper contains a number of interesting empirical findings relating to 
husbands' and wives' party political identifications in combination in Great 
Britain. The vast majority of British couples were found to be homogamous 
for party political identification. People whose support for the party that they 
identified with was not very strong were found to be disproportionately likely 
to have been part of a heterogamous couple, and members of heterogamous 
couples were found to have been `against' the party that their partner identified 
with in only a minority of cases. 
The relationship between strength of party political identification and 
party political homogamy remained strong in the context of a multivariate 
analysis of party political heterogamy which included a number of other 
relevant factors. In this multivariate analysis heterogamy was found to be 
disproportionately frequent among people with heterogamous parents, people 
aged less than 35, and people who were neither legally married to nor 
cohabiting with their partners. 
The level of similarity of party political identification between marriage 
partners was found to be similar to the level of similarity between relatives 
living in the same household, but greater than the level of similarity in other 
relationships 
`Agreement on politics' was only thought to be important to a successful 
marriage by a small minority of people, and was thought less important in this 
context than other forms of similarity. Older people were found to be more 
likely than younger people to see agreement on politics as important. 
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Finally, Labour/Conservative disparities in voting intention were found 
to be significantly more frequent among remarriages than among first 
marriages. 
 
The theoretical relevance of patterns of par ty political homogamy 
Party political homogamy should be of interest to political scientists, since the 
salience of party political identification in the context of partner selection can 
be viewed as part of the broader salience of party politics to an individual's life 
in general. The extent of party political homogamy and any trends in party 
political homogamy may well reflect the extent to which we demand spouses 
who share our views of the world, but may also reflect the extent to which we 
see party politics as relevant to our day-to-day lives. Additionally, if 
homogamy of party political identification is seen to be partly a consequence 
of the `stratification' of society by political attitudes, and given that the 
distribution of party political support is already known to vary between 
different geographical areas and different occupational groups, it would be 
interesting to discover the extent to which `social circles' are homogeneous 
with respect to party political identification. However, an examination of party 
political homogamy can also contribute to our understanding of the 
relationship between heterogamy and marital instability, and also our 
understanding of the origins of homogamy. 
The impact of heterogamy of party political identification on marital 
stability is at least as worthy of study as the impact of various other forms of 
heterogamy, especially since differences in political viewpoint are perhaps a 
more obvious source of conflict than differences in family or educational 
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background. 
A number of the empirical results in this paper shed some light on the 
relationship between party political homogamy and marital instability. First of 
all, most couples who are heterogamous in this respect do not have very strong 
party political identifications, and are not against their partners' parties. 
Agreement on politics was also shown to be viewed as less important to a 
successful marriage than other forms of homogamy. Thus party political 
homogamy is not explicitly a universal cultural norm, and party political 
heterogamy in itself should not be automatically assumed to reduce the utility 
of marriages by generating conflict. Conversely, agreement on politics was 
shown to be important to some people, and in half of the Labour\Conservative 
couples the respondent was against their partner's party, suggesting that there 
may be potential for utility-reducing conflict within these couples. The 
analysis of party political homogamy in relation to age provides some 
evidence in support of this last possibility since it indicated that 
Labour\Conservative heterogamous couples may be disproportionately prone 
to marital dissolution, or may tend to deal with the problematic disparity by 
becoming homogamous. (This assumes that there has been no abrupt trend 
towards Labour\Conservative heterogamy). Additionally, the greater level of 
party political heterogamy among remarriages may reflect a relationship 
between party political heterogamy and marital instability in first marriages 
(i.e. individuals who tend to be heterogamous may also tend to have unstable 
marriages because they reject all marriage-related cultural norms, or because 
they are bad at assessing the utility of relationships). Note, however, that the 
pattern could also reflect a greater level of contact between politically 
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dissimilar people within the remarriage market. Overall, the evidence appears 
consistent with the idea that some extremely heterogamous couples may be at 
an increased risk of marital dissolution if they remain heterogamous. 
The results also shed some light on the relative merits of the various 
theoretical explanations of the origins of party political homogamy. 
Demographic constraints appear to be important. There is a significant level of 
homogamy among people whose party political identifications are not very 
strong, which possibly reflects the party political homogeneity of the social 
circles that those people move in more than it reflects individual choice. 
Evidence for this party political homogeneity comes from the finding that 
many forms of social relationships are marked by party political similarity. As 
noted above, agreement on politics is not perceived as particularly important 
to a successful marriage, despite the high levels of observed party political 
homogamy. This apparent rejection of the cultural importance of party 
political homogamy strengthens the argument that it originates from 
demographic constraints. It is also difficult to see what utility is gained from 
party political homogamy among relatively apolitical people in the absence of 
a strong cultural norm of party political homogamy. Furthermore, the observed 
relationship between age and the perceived importance of agreement on 
politics suggests that the cultural importance of party political homogamy may 
be declining, while observed levels of party political homogamy remain more 
or less constant. Once again, this downplays the importance of cultural 
explanations of homogamy relative to explanations relating to demographic 
constraints. Finally, both the high level of party political homogamy for young 
ages at marriage and the high level of party political heterogamy for 
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remarriages can be explained in terms of the homogeneity\heterogeneity of 
social circles\marriage markets, with the former being difficult to explain by 
reference to the cultural or utility-maximisation explanations of homogamy. 
The empirical findings in this paper also provide some support for the 
cultural and utility-maximisation explanations of party political homogamy. 
Some findings, for example the high level of heterogamy among non-
cohabiting couples, and the greater level of similarity between marriage 
partners than is evident in other forms of social relationship, are equally 
consistent with cultural and utility-maximising explanations. (In both these 
examples similarity is greater in the more `involved' form of relationship, 
which either reflects a greater pressure to adhere to cultural norms, or a greater 
need to avoid the loss in utility resulting from dissimilarity). 
However, some of the other findings seem to sit more comfortably 
alongside one of these two explanations than the other. The high level of party 
political homogamy among those with very strong party political 
identifications is probably an example of a strong tendency towards 
homogamy among a group for whom heterogamy would involve a great 
reduction in utility. Conversely, the intergenerational transmission of party 
political homogamy\heterogamy (presumably via socialization) is most easily 
explained in cultural terms. Additionally, the fact that some people see 
agreement on politics as important to a successful marriage provides support 
for the idea of a cultural norm of homogamy, albeit a weak one, whereas the 
probable vulnerability of some heterogamous couples, i.e. 
Labour\Conservative couples, gives credence to the utility-maximisation 
explanation. Note, as mentioned earlier in this paper, that these two forms of 
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explanation are not mutually exclusive; the utility-maximisation explanation 
of party political homogamy would benefit from an assessment of the costs 
and benefits of adhering to cultural norms. 
In conclusion, the findings in this paper are consistent with a theory of 
the origins of party political homogamy which incorporates demographic 
constraints, individual choices geared towards maximising the utility of 
marriage, and responses to cultural pressures. The difficulty inherent in trying 
to identify whether party political homogamy reflects a cultural norm of 
homogamy or the aggregated choices of rational social actors relates to the 
familiar issue of the relative roles played by structure and agency in 
determining social behaviour. However, this paper has indicated that a third 
possibility needs to be considered, i.e. that homogamy at least partially reflects 
the fact that society is an aggregation of a myriad of internally homogeneous 
`social circles'. This is not a novel observation (see Henry, 1972), but it is an 
important one, especially given that it is quite possible that the origins and 
consequences of other forms of social homogamy are similar to the origins and 
consequences of party political homogamy. 
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TABLE 1 Husband's party political identification (PPI) and wife's 
party political identification in combination 
═════════════════════════════════════════════ 
      Wife's PPI 
Husband's PPI
Conservative 641 (40.3%)  48  (3.0%)  86  (5.4%) 
 Cons've Labour All'nce 
Labour   68  (4.3%) 370 (23.3%)  62  (3.9%) 
Alliance   77  (4.8%)  36  (2.3%) 203 (12.8%) 
═════════════════════════════════════════════ 
Notes
n=1,591. Data from BES (see text). Percentages relate to the total 
number of cases in the table. 
: 
Respondent's party political identification was obtained from 
Question 12 on the interview questionnaire: "Generally thinking, 
do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal, Social 
Democrat... or what?" and (if the respondent answered "No" or 
"Don't know") "Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer 
to one of the Parties than the other?". 
Respondent's partner's party political identification was 
obtained from Question 22 on the self-completion questionnaire: 
"Please think of the two
 
 people you discussed politics with most 
often, during the election campaign", "What relationship is this 
person to you" [one category was husband/wife/partner], and "As 
far as you know, does this person think of himself or herself as 
Conservative, Labour, SDP or Liberal or Alliance... or something 
else?". 
 
 45 
TABLE 2 Husband's voting intention (VI) and wife's voting 
intention in combination 
═════════════════════════════════════════════ 
                                 Wife's VI 
Husband's VI
Conservative 201 (27.2%)  18  (2.4%)  49  (6.6%) 
 Cons've Labour All'nce 
Labour   13  (1.8%) 193 (26.2%)  35  (4.7%) 
Alliance   41  (4.8%)  30  (4.1%) 158 (21.4%) 
═════════════════════════════════════════════ 
Notes
n=738. Data from SCELI (see text). Percentages relate to the total 
number of cases in the table. 
: 
Respondents' and respondents' partners voting intentions were 
obtained from Questions 122 and 123 on their respective self-
completion questionnaires: "If there was a general election 
tomorrow would you vote?" and "Which political party would you 
vote for?". 
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TABLE 3  Logistic regression analysis of party political 
heterogamy  
──────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Independent         Parameter   Standard     P     
 variable          Estimate (B)  Error     Value   Exp(B) 
──────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Party Political ID                        0.000 
  Conservative         0.000 
  Labour               0.396     0.157    0.012    1.486 
  Alliance             1.019     0.155    0.000    2.770 
Strength of party ID                      0.000  
  Very strong          0.000 
  Fairly strong        0.800     0.208    0.000    2.226 
  Not very strong      1.503     0.216    0.000    4.494 
  Not states           0.497     0.362    0.169    1.644 
Voted in 1987 (turnout)                   0.019 
  Yes                  0.000 
  No                   0.505     0.186    0.007    1.658 
  Unknown             -0.183     0.336    0.587    0.833 
Parental marriage                         0.054 
  Homogamous           0.000 
  Heterogamous         0.469     0.206    0.023    1.598 
  Unknown             -0.055     0.153    0.720    0.947 
Respondent's age                          0.510 
  Under 35 years       0.000 
  35 or more years    -0.122     0.152    0.423    0.885 
  Unknown              0.494     0.709    0.486    1.639 
Marital status                            0.014 
  Legally married      0.000 
  Cohabiting           0.034     0.331    0.918    1.035 
  Neither              0.760     0.262    0.004    2.137 
Social class                              0.336 
  Salariat             0.000 
  Routine non-manual  -0.286     0.181    0.115    0.751 
  Petty bourgeoisie   -0.521     0.296    0.079    0.594 
  Foreman\technician  -0.297     0.333    0.372    0.743 
  Working class       -0.024     0.187    0.900    0.977 
  Unclassifiable      -0.258     0.496    0.603    0.773 
Highest qualification                     0.322 
  None of below        0.000 
  `O' level            0.088     0.162    0.589    1.092 
  `A' level\Degree     0.289     0.193    0.134    1.335 
Occupational homogamy                     0.920 
  Heterogamy           0.000 
  Homogamy            -0.099     0.245    0.685    0.906 
  Unknown             -0.027     0.396    0.947    0.974 
Constant              -0.781     0.311    0.012 
──────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Notes
Scaled deviance = 1569.2 
: n=1,591. Data from BES (see text). 
Change in deviance from null model = 173.1 on 22 degrees of 
freedom (p = 0.000) 
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TABLE 4  Logistic regression analysis of party political 
heterogamy: Labour and Conservative respondents and partners 
only 
──────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Independent         Parameter   Standard     P     
 variable          Estimate (B)  Error     Value   Exp(B) 
──────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Party Political ID                        0.006 
  Conservative         0.000 
  Labour               0.601     0.221    0.006    1.823 
Strength of party ID                      0.000  
  Very strong          0.000 
  Fairly strong        0.766     0.351    0.029    2.152 
  Not very strong      1.759     0.359    0.000    5.808 
  Not states           0.576     0.569    0.311    1.779 
Voted in 1987 (turnout)                   0.005 
  Yes                  0.000 
  No                   0.826     0.278    0.003    2.283 
  Unknown              0.679     0.422    0.107    1.973 
Parental marriage                         0.164 
  Homogamous           0.000 
  Heterogamous         0.597     0.336    0.076    1.816 
  Unknown             -0.080     0.256    0.755    0.923 
Respondent's age                          0.119 
  Under 35 years       0.000 
  35 or more years    -0.491     0.245    0.045    0.612 
  Unknown              0.255     1.236    0.837    1.290 
Marital status                            0.162 
  Legally married      0.000 
  Cohabiting           0.184     0.437    0.673    1.202 
  Neither              0.722     0.379    0.057    2.058 
Social class                              0.335 
  Salariat             0.000 
  Routine non-manual  -0.038     0.311    0.904    0.963 
  Petty bourgeoisie   -0.834     0.556    0.134    0.435 
  Foreman\technician   0.163     0.483    0.735    1.177 
  Working class        0.334     0.319    0.295    1.397 
  Unclassifiable      -6.958    11.546    0.547    0.001 
Highest qualification                     0.593 
  None of below        0.000 
  `O' level            0.269     0.268    0.315    1.308 
  `A' level\Degree     0.209     0.344    0.543    1.233 
Occupational homogamy                     0.718 
  Heterogamy           0.000 
  Homogamy            -0.041     0.397    0.917    0.960 
  Unknown              0.530     0.663    0.424    1.700 
Constant              -2.452     1.984    0.217 
──────────────────────────────────────────────────── 
Notes
Scaled deviance = 656.7 
: n=1,127. Data from BES (see text). 
Change in deviance from null model = 90.4 on 21 degrees of 
freedom (p = 0.000) 
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TABLE 5 Husband's party political identification (PPI) and wife's 
party political identification in combination according to the 
strength of the respondent's party political identification 
═════════════════════════════════════════════ 
      
Respondent's PPI = Very strong 
Wife's PPI 
Husband's PPI
Conservative 165 (51.1%)   7  (2.2%)   4  (1.2%) 
 Cons've Labour All'nce 
Labour    4  (1.2%)  96 (29.7%)   4  (1.2%) 
Alliance   12  (3.7%)   3  (0.9%)  28  (8.7%) 
 
      
Respondent's PPI = Fairly strong 
Wife's PPI 
Husband's PPI
Conservative 315 (42.1%)  24  (3.2%)  37  (4.9%) 
 Cons've Labour All'nce 
Labour   25  (3.3%) 180 (24.1%)  23  (3.1%) 
Alliance   35  (4.7%)  17  (2.3%)  92 (12.3%) 
 
      
Respondent's PPI = Not very strong 
Wife's PPI 
Husband's PPI
Conservative 124 (28.2%)  16  (3.6%)  43  (9.8%) 
 Cons've Labour All'nce 
Labour   35  (8.0%)  70 (15.9%)  33  (7.5%) 
Alliance   27  (6.2%)  15  (3.4%)  76 (17.3%) 
═════════════════════════════════════════════ 
Notes
Overall, n=1,510. Data from BES (see text). Percentages relate to 
the total number of cases in each sub-table; n=323, n=748 and 
n=439 respectively. 
: 
Data on strength of respondent's party political identification 
was obtained from Question 12(c): "Would you call yourself very 
strong [Conservative, Labour, etc.], fairly strong or not very 
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strong?". 81 cases included in Table 1 were omitted from Table 5 
because they did not answer 12(c) or answered "Don't know". 
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TABLE 6 Respondent's party political (PPI) identification in 
combination with the party political identifications of various 
categories of relatives, friends and acquaintances 
═════════════════════════════════════════════ 
Family members in respondent's household 
     
(other than respondent's partner) 
Family member's PPI 
Respondent's PPI
Conservative 193 (34.6%)  31  (5.6%)  28  (5.0%) 
 Cons've Labour All'nce 
Labour   30  (5.4%) 154 (27.6%)  13  (2.3%) 
Alliance   30  (5.4%)  18  (3.2%)  60 (10.8%) 
Family members not in respondent's household 
     
(other than respondent's partner) 
Family member's PPI 
Respondent's PPI
Conservative 131 (28.7%)  42  (9.2%)  27  (5.9%) 
 Cons've Labour All'nce 
Labour   28  (6.1%) 117 (25.7%)  16  (3.5%) 
Alliance   31  (6.8%)  27  (5.9%)  37  (8.1%) 
     
Neighbours 
Neighbour's PPI 
Respondent's PPI
Conservative  76 (35.5%)  10  (4.7%)  13  (6.1%) 
 Cons've Labour All'nce 
Labour   22 (10.3%)  45 (21.0%)  11  (5.1%) 
Alliance   10  (4.7%)   9  (4.2%)  18  (8.4%) 
     
Co-workers 
Co-worker's PPI 
Respondent's PPI
Conservative 147 (23.7%)  77 (12.4%)  44  (7.1%) 
 Cons've Labour All'nce 
Labour   58  (9.3%) 124 (20.0%)  23  (3.7%) 
Alliance   52  (8.4%)  63 (10.1%)  33  (5.3%) 
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Other friends 
Other friend's PPI 
Respondent's PPI
Conservative 166 (28.2%)  65 (11.1%)  36  (6.1%) 
 Cons've Labour All'nce 
Labour   35  (6.0%) 125 (21.3%)  25  (4.3%) 
Alliance   41  (7.3%)  51  (8.7%)  44  (7.5%) 
═════════════════════════════════════════════ 
Notes: Data from BES (see text and Table 1). Percentages relate to 
the total number of cases in each sub-table; n=557, n=456, n=621, 
n=214, and n=588 respectively. 
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TABLE 7 The relationship between age and respondent's 
perception of the importance of "agreement on politics" to a 
successful marriage 
═════════════════════════════════════════════ 
     Very  Fairly Not Very Not At All 
Age
Under 35   6  (1.2%)  47  (9.7%) 262 (53.9%) 171 (35.2%) 
   Important Important Important Important 
35 to 49   6  (1.4%)  49 (11.3%) 264 (61.0%) 114 (26.3%) 
50 to 64  15  (4.2%)  44 (12.3%) 200 (55.9%)  99 (27.7%) 
65 or over  14  (5.5%)  58 (22.8%) 136 (53.5%)  46 (18.1%) 
═════════════════════════════════════════════ 
Notes
Data from BSAS (see text). Percentages in each row add up to 
100%; n=1,531. 
: 
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TABLE 8 Homogamy/heterogamy of voting intention compared 
between first marriages and remarriages 
═════════════════════════════════════════════ 
Respondents in their first marriages 
Wife's voting  
  
Husband's voting intention 
intention
Conservative 171 (27.2%)   7  (1.1%)  35  (5.6%) 
  Con  Lab  All 
Labour   11  (1.8%) 165 (26.3%)  27  (4.3%) 
Alliance   41  (6.5%)  32  (5.1%) 139 (22.1%) 
 
Respondents in second or later marriages 
(following at least one divorce) 
Wife's voting  
  
Husband's voting intention 
intention
Conservative  23 (32.4%)   4  (5.6%)   4  (5.6%) 
  Con  Lab  All 
Labour    5  (7.0%)  13 (18.3%)   0  (0.0%) 
Alliance    7  (9.9%)   2  (2.8%)  13 (18.3%) 
═════════════════════════════════════════════ 
Notes
Data from SCELI (see text). The Percentages in each sub-table add 
up to 100%, and the sample sizes in the two sub-tables are n=628 
and n=71 respectively. 
: 
 
Details of log-linear models fitted to the above table
[A] = Wife's voting intention 
: 
[B] = Husband's voting intention 
[C] = First marriage or remarriage  
[D] = Factor differentiating between couples involving a disparity 
between Labour and Conservative and all other couples 
 54 
═════════════════════════════════════════════ 
Model   Deviance         
[AB][AC][BC] 15.5 on 4 d.f. (p<.01) 
Change in deviance 
 + [CD]   4.3 on 3 d.f. (p>.05)  11.2 on 1 d.f. (p<.001) 
═════════════════════════════════════════════ 
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